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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a new econometric framework for inalyzing labor supply.
Traditionally, by labor supply it is meant the decisions of whether or not to work and how
many hours of work, or from the econometrician's point of view, the hours of work
distribution including the participation probability. In the present paper this definition is
extended to include the choice among non-pecuniary, qualitative aspects of the jobs.
The principle purpose of our study is to develope an empirical model for labor supply
in the presence of complicated budget sets and qualitative job attributes. Similar to most
countries in the western world, the Norwegian tax system implies a non-convex budget set.
The option of joint and separate taxation for married couples, social security rules and tax
allowances turn an otherwise progressive tax structure into a structure which is not uniformly
progressive, rather partially regressive. In recent years the tax system has been reformed and
considerably simplified in Norway as in many other countries. Still the budget set is kinked
and some non-convexities remain. Fixed costs of working contribute to this non-convexity as
job-specific wage rates also do (Moffitt (1984)). Therefore, the traditional marginal calculus
is not sufficient to simulate optimal behavior. Global rather than local criteria have to be
applied.
Most of the labor supply studies have used the counterfactual assumption of a convex
and smooth budget set (cf. early contributions such as Rosen (1976), Nakamura and
Nakamura (1981), Wales and Woodland (1979) and more recent contributions by Kohlase
(1986) and Ransom (1987). Only recently there have been attempts to take the non-convexity
properties of the tax structure into account. These attempts are in most cases versions of the
approach suggested by Burtless and Hausman (1978) (cf. Arrufat and Zabalza (1986),
Blomquist (1983), Hausman (1980), (1981), (1985), Hausman and Ruud (1984) and the
special issue of Journal of Human Resources, vol. 25, 3, 1990). In the Hausman procedure
consistency of the maximum likelihood method requires that Slutsky restrictions are imposed
(Kapteyn et al. (1990) and MaCurdy et al. (1990)) which can be difficult to do even with
rather simple functional forms for the utility function. Another problem with the "Hausman-
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approach" is that in practice it turns out to be difficult to locate a maximum of the likelihood
function, even with a convex budget set. A unique extremal point of the likelihood function
cannot be guaranteed. In the case of modeling the behavior of married couples - which is the
concern of the present paper - the "Hausman-approach" seems to give rather insurmountable
calculation problems. This is especially the case if we allow for an exact representation of the
budget set and a specification of preferences that allow for non-linear labor supply curves in
marginal wage and virtual income.
A crucial assumption in most of the previous studies is that the individual is free to
choose whether or not to work and the preferred hours of work. In most western European
countries the observed hours of work often show extreme consentTation around full time and
part time hours. This indicates that important constraints on hours are present (see Dickens
and Lundberg (1985)). Even if these peaks at full and part time hours are interpreted as being
generated from preferences, the conventional approach with concave preferences will fail to
explain the data unless a particular heterogeneity assumption is imposed.
The framework presented here is consistent with the notion of qualitative aspects of
jobs as well as fixed hours of work determined by institutional regulations. Specifically, the
choice environment is assumed to consist of a latent set of opportunities called matches. A
match is defined as a particular combination of working conditions including hours, wages
and non-pecuniary characteristics. The set of matches available to the individual is latent and
individual specific. It is therefore perceived as random (to the econometrician). While
previous empirical labor supply models interpret unobservable heterogeneity as generated
from differences in preferences our framework also allows for unobserved heterogeneity in
opportunities. Furthermore, the model allows for disequilibrium in which prices and wages
are set so that unvoluntairy unemployment occurs.
The empirical part of our paper deals with labor supply of married couples in Norway
in 1979 and 1986. We assume that the couple's decisions concerning labor supply are made
simultaneously. All previous studies of labor supply with taxes, except for Hausman and Ruud
(1984) and Ransom (1987), assume that the wife takes the husband's income as given. In a
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labor supply study without taxes Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) have demonstrated that
cross elasticities may be significant.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the individual
decision model which includes a characterization of the stochastic properties of the
unobservables. In Section 3 equilibrium conditions and the probability distribution function
for the labor supply and the realized wage rate is derived for one-person households. In
Section 4 the model is extended to two-person households. Data are described in Section 5.
The data sets contain detailed information about taxes, transfers and incomes and they are
based on filled-in tax returns that are checked and approved by local taxation authorities.
Empirical results are presented in the remaining Sections 6-8.
2. THE MODEL
Contrary to the traditional approach in the analysis of labor supply (see Killingsworth
(1983) for a review of models) we have adopted a theoretical framework in which the choice
environment is assumed to consist of a latent random set of opportunities, called matches.
Each match corresponds to a particular combination of skills required to perform certain tasks
or activities, and characteristics of the job such as hours of work, wage rate and non-
pecuniary attributes.
Our theoretical model is related to the matching models of Tindbergen (1956), Hartog
(1978), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) and Dickens and Lundberg (1985). The implied
econometric model is particularly convenient for dealing with general budget constraints,
flexible specification of preferences and restrictions on hours of work as well as joint labor
supply decisions of husband and wife.
2.1. Preferences and pecuniary budget constraint
We assume that a match, z, can be characterized by a four-dimensional vector variable
(11(z), W(z), T 1(z), T2(z)). The attribute T1 (z) is associated with variables that have a direct
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influence on pecuniary rewards as well as preferences while T2(z) is assumed only to affect
the pecuniary rewards. The latter variable - T2(z) - thus reflects match-specific requirements
which hardly can be by the econometrician. H(z) and W(z) are the hours of work and wage
rate respectively, associated with the match. We assume that hours of work and the attributes,
T(z).(T1(z),T2(z)), are exogenously determined by the firms or by institutional regulations.
Thus for a given individual the set of feasible attributes (I1(z), T(z), z=1,2,...) is given in the
short run. The determination of wage rates, (W(z)), will be discussed in the next section.
Let U(C,h,z) denote the households utility function where C is annual disposable
income, h is yearly hours of work and z indexes the match. For the moment we concentrate
our discussion to one-person households. Conditional on match z the budget constraints are
defined by
(2.1)	 h = H(z) ,
and
(2.2)	 pC pC(z) = f(H(z)W(z),1),
where f(') is the function that transforms gross income into after-tax income (consumption)
and p is the composite price index. The form of f() depends on the tax and social security
system. Thus f(') may have discontinuous jumps. For our analysis below it will be sufficient
to assume that f(') is piecewise continuous. The variable I is non-labor income. Eq. (2.1)
means that given the match then hours of work follows.
The utility function is assumed to have the structure
(2.3)
	
U (C, h, z) = v (C, h, T i(z)) + e (z)
where v(.) is a deterministic function and e(z) is a random variable. For given z, e(z) reflects
unobserved heterogeneity in tastes across individuals, and for a given individual, e(z), z=1,2,...
account for unobserved taste variations across matches. After the budget constraints (2.1) and
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(2.2) are inserted in (2.3) the utility function takes the form
(2.4)
	
U(C(z),H(z),z) = v (C(z),H(z),T i(z)) + e(z) .
In order to distinguish the attributes (T(z)) from the interpretation of (e(z)) we may
think of (T(z)) as variables that are "objective" in the sense that in principle they can be
measured and they have the same value relative to any individual. We might think of the T-
attributes, at least (T i(z)), as variables that can be measured through survey questionaires or
obtained from official statistics (see Hartog op.cit.). In contrast, the variable e(z) is a
subjectively perceived, individual specific taste-shifter. It is of course difficult to make a sharp
distinction between these variables.
2.2. The distribution of match attributes and taste shifters
Now let us introduce assumptions about the distribution of the attributes and the
tasteshifters. Heterogeneity in opportunities implies that the set of feasible matches is
perceived as random by the econometrician. The reason why the choice set is random to the
observer is because he does not have the same information about the determinants of market
opportunities as the individual. Thus while traditional econometric labor supply models only
account for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences the approach proposed here focuses on
heterogeneity both in opportunities and preferences. The problem is of course to obtain a
convenient representation of these types of heterogeneity in a structural model.
As discussed above the market opportunities are represented by (H(z), T(z), z=1,2,..4.
Specifically, we assume that the set of feasible attributes of the matches, and taste values,
{H(z), T(z), e(z)), are random and generated by a Poisson law as follows: The values (H(z),





X(dh,dt I s) • eide, t =	 t2),
where fi is an upper bound on hours and «'Is) is a finite measure that depends on the
worker's experience and level of schooling, s (observable). The reason for conditioning on
s will become clear below. Note that s characterizes the qualifications of the agent while
(T(z)) are match-specific attributes. The interpretation of the Poisson process on (0,11] x (0,112
X R is analogous to the familiar Poisson process on R. Specifically, the points of this process
are independent draws from a probability distribution, and the probability that a match for
which
(H(z)e (h,h +dh), T(z)e (t,t +dt), e(z)e (e,e +de))
is equal to
(dh, dt I s)e -gcle + o (dhdtde ).
Moreover, the mean number of matches within A x [el ,e2], where
A = [h1 ,h2] x [t1 ,4] x
is equal to
(2.6) A (A x [e 1 , e 2} I s) SA Igi (dh, dt1 ,dt2 I s)e "'de = (e -11 - e "12) j: (dh, dti , dt2 I s).
Let N(Ax[e1 ,e2]) be the number of matches within A x [e1 ,e2]. Then by the Poisson
An(Ax[ei,e2]Is)
exp(-A(Ax[evejls))P(N(Ax[e 1 ,e 2]) = n) = 	
n!
which is the wellknown Poisson probability density in higher dimensions. Note that while
H(z) and T(z) may be interdependent, e(z) is independent of (H(z),T(z)). As we shall discuss




from (2.6) that the mean total number of feasible matches, M(0,ii]x(0,1],R), is infinite. This
property complicates the discussion on the interpretation of X,. The interpretation is however
facilitated by restricting the set of feasible matches to those matches for which e(z)>b where
b is a constant.
Now define
(2.8)0(h,t I s) = A((0 h]x(0 t] x [b" 	 =	 '00) s)	 X(h t Is)e -b
	A 00,11] x (OM X [b,00) I s)	 (h,11 s) e ""b
where [OA = [0,t 1]x[0,t2]. The interpretation of 0(h,t Is) is as the mean number of feasible
matches for which (H(z$11,T(z)St,e(z)>b) relative to the mean number of feasible matches
with e(z)>b.
By (2.8) it follows that
(2.9) 0(h,t I s) = X.(ht I s)1 = (1,1)
X(h,1 Is)
which means that 0 is independent of the threshold value b. We shall call 0(.1s) the
cumulative opportunity distribution (cf. Ben-Aldva et al. (1985)). The opportunity distribution
0(h,t Is) can be interpreted as the probability that a match for which (H(z)511,T(z)St,e(z)>b)
(for any b > -00) is feasible to the individual. It follows from (2.7) that with probability one
the number of feasible matches with e(z)>b is finite. Since b does not appear in (2.9), 0(.1s)
remains unchanged if we let b-4-00. Accordingly, it makes sense to interpret 0(h,t Is) as the
mean number of points in the Poisson process for which {H(z)511, T(z)St), relative to the
mean numbers of points in the process.
The particular structure of the intensity measure introduced above is chosen for
convenience, but it can also be given a choice theoretic justification, cf. Dagsvik (1991).
OMNI
In the next section it will become clear that 0(.1s) and X(h,11s) are needed to
express the labor supply distribution. Let us therefore also discuss the interpretation of
k(h,l Is). To this end it is convenient to introduce a reference state for the sets of market
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opportunities and it is natural to choose the one where the attributes (H(z), T(z), z=1,2,...)
are uniformly distributed. Thus in this reference state the intensity measure takes the form
mdhdt i dt2e'de
where m is a constant. The corresponding mean number of points for which e(z)>b, equals
mLdhdt1 dt21 cede = rie -bm
MOD
where K = [0,h] x [0,112. Since the notion of reference state is somewhat arbitrary we may -
without loss of generality - choose m=1/11. From (2.6) it then follows that the mean number
of feasible attributes for which e(z)>b equals X(h,1 I s)e-b. Similarly, to (2.9) we may therefore
interpret 0(s) defmed by
X(1-1,11s)cb _ X(ii. ,11s) = x(-1,1Is)O(s) = 	 -	
-
m he	 m h
as the mean number of feasible attributes relative to the mean total number of uniformly
distributed attributes. We shall call 0(s) the opportunity measure of market matches - or
simply the opportunity measure.
As demonstrated in appendix III the particular Poisson process formulation above
implies that the distribution of the indirect utility function, given that the individual works,
is extreme value distributed. It is therefore natural to postulate that the utility of non-partici-
pation also is extreme value distributed. Let z=0 index the non-market alternative for which
we have H(0) = T1(0) = T2(0) = O. This implies that
(2.10)	 P(e(0)y) = exp(-e-Y).
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3. THE MARKET DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES AND HOURS OF WORK
In this section we shall consider the wage formation process and the distribution of
wages and hours of work in the market. Our ambition is not to specify a full structural
equilibrium model. The sole purpose is to derive an empirical labor supply model which is
consistent with different stories about the market adjustment process - whether market
clearing is attained or not.
3.1. The probability density of realized wages and hours of work
As already noted wages are match-specific and we shall assume that they depend on
match z through the attributes (H(z),T1 (z),T2(z)), i.e., for match z
(3.1) W(z) = *(H(z), T i(z), T2(z)) ,
where fve) is a function that specifies how labor is priced out. Recall that T2(z) is associated
with match-specific skills. For given values of the other attributes, H(z) and T1(z), (3.1) then
says that labor is priced out according to these match-specific skills. Given reasonable
assumptions about functional forms, (3.1) can be inverted to yield
(3.2) T2(z) 12 (W(z), H(z), T i (z)) ,
where 120 is the function that solves w = *(h,t 1 ,i2(w,h,t1)). In other words, t2 is the value
of the match-specific skills that is consistent with the wage Al' when H(z)=h and T1 (z)=t1 . How
the form of the wage-function is determined will be discussed below.
Let (h,t s) denote the density of the cumulative distribution 0(h,t s) in (2.9). From
(3.1)-(3.2) we can derive the opportunity density, g( s), for the attributes (11(z), W(z),
Ti(z)). Provided i2(h,w,t1) is differentiable with respect to w we get
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(3.3)
g(h,w,ti Is) = g(h,t1 ,12 (h,w,t1)is) 
ai2 (h,w,t1)   
aw      
The interpretation of (3.3) is as the density of observable match attributes, including wage,
conditional on the set of feasible market opportunities.
The individual is assumed to choose a match, 2, that solves the utility maximization
problem
(3.4)	 max. [v (C(z),H(z), Ti(z)) + c(z)1 = v (C (I), H(I), TA) + e 2.
Recall that fe(z)) is unknown to the econometrician but known to the maximizing agent who
is assumed to have a perfect knowledge of market opportunities while the econometrician
only observe the realized values (C(2), W(2), T1(2)). Let OH s) be the joint cumulative
distribution of (H(2), W(2), T 1 (2)), i.e.,
(3.5)
(1) (h, w, I s) = P{ max. [v (C(z),H(z), T i(z)) + e (z)] = v (CM, H(2), T i (2)) + e(2) Is}
H(z)Sh,W(z)w,Ti(z)Sti
The particular structure of the intensity measure (2.5) implies that the probability
density, cp, of cb has a simple functional form. The derivation of p is completely analogous
to de Haan (1984) and Dagsvik (1991) but since the argument is non-standard we provide a
proof in appendix III. The resulting labor supply density has the form
(3.6)	 9(h,w,t1 s) =
0(s)(exp(v(h,w,t1)))g(h,w,t1 Is)
0(s) jjpexp (w(x,y,u))) g (x,y,u I s) dxdydu + exp (w(0,0,0))
for h>0, w>0, t1>0 and
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(33)	 y(0,0,0 Is) 	 exp (v(0,0,0)) 
el(s)fff(exp (v(x,y,u))) g (x,y,u I s) dxdydu + exp (v(0,0,0))
where
v(h,w,ti) v(f(hw, I)/p , h, t i) .
From the discussion on page 10 we recall that 0(s) can be interpreted as a measure of the
mean size of the set of feasible matches relative to the mean size of the set of uniformly
distributed attributes in the reference state.
Eqs. (3.6) and (3.7) express the density of (H(2),W(2),T 1(2)) in terms of the mean
utility, the opportunity measure and the opportunity density. In other words, the choice density
is consistent with the notion of random, unobservable choice sets and preferences where the
preferences are represented by it and the choice opportunities are represented by e(s) and
g( I s).
The model above is similar to the continuous logit type of model developed by Ben-
Akiva et al. (1985). They obtain the continuous logit type of model as the limit obtained by
letting the choice set of corresponding discrete model tend towards infinity. The advantage
with the Poisson process setting is that we obtain the continuous choice model directly. More
important, the present approach allows for the interpretation of random choice sets which is
appealing since, most likely, individuals are heterogenous with respect to opportunities as well
as preferences.
3.2. Equilibrium wage distribution
We now turn to the determination of the wage function; i.e., the form of *(').
Note first that the density g(h,w,t, s) can be decomposed as
(3.8)	 g(h,w,ti Is) =	 Is)g2(w 111,ti, ․)
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where g2(wili,ti ,․) is the conditional (opportunity) density of offered wages given matches for
which (H(z)=h, Ti(z)=ti) and the workers level of schooling and experience, s. The term
gi(h,tds) is the opportunity density of (H(z),Ti(z)). We may think of gi (h,ti Is) as the
fraction of market matches for which a worker with skills s is qualified for. gi(h,t, s) is
assumed to be determined by institutional regulations and firm-specific factors that are beyond
the present paper to discuss. For expository reasons it is convenient to express the supply
density in (3.6) as a functional of 13(s)g1(.1s) and g2(.I .,․), i.e.,
(3.9) (h, w, I s) E (h, w, ; 0(s) ( • I s), g2 (.1
where the functional form of 11 is apparent from (3.6).
Let y(h,w,ti Is) denote the probability density of labor demand, which corresponds to
the supply density (3.6). The empirical counterpart of ?(.) is the number of jobs - with the
specified attributes - offered by firms to workers with education and experience, s, relative
to the total number of jobs in the economy.
In the case of flexible wages the density of supply, demand and realized match
attributes must be equal, in which case the NV-function - or equivalently - the density
g2(w I h,t1 ,․) is determined by
(3.10) g(h,w,ti; 0(s)gi (-I s),g2 (-1 -, ․)) = y(h,w,ti Is),
In fact, a definition of equilibrium similar to (3.10) is given by Tinbergen (1956). The model
(3.6)-(3.7) is thus embedded in an equilibrium setting where labor is priced out according to
match-specific skills (eq. (3.1)) and the wage opportunity density g2(w lh,ti ,․) is determined
by (3.10) so that all markets clear.
As mentioned above the tasteshifters fe(z)) are not correlated with the match
attributes. However, the distributional properties of the tasteshifters are reflected in the
functional form of 1.t. If the sample is small, this means that the empirical distribution of
supply does not necessarily coincide with the demand distribution. Thus the present
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equilibrium concept only provides market clearing in the sense that supply equals demand in
a large sample.
3.3. Disequilibrium
The Poisson process framework also allows for a different wage formation process
than the one adopted above. In the disequilibrium literature it is acknowledged that there often
are severe market imperfections that may prevent markets from clearing. These market
imperfections are related to the fact that contracts are costly to dissolve, learning is costly and
takes time and unions control to a great extent the wage formation process and they do not
always adjust their negotiation policy so as to fully accommodate for excess supply and
demand.
Consider now the case when wages are rigid, i.e., the wage function *0 is not
determined so as to yield equilibrium. For simplicity we shall assume that the demand side
is not rationed, i.e., the demanders are always able to realize their demand. Le gs2(w lh,ti ,․)
denote the corresponding conditional wage opportunity density. The supply density in this
case thus takes the form
(3.11) g(h,w,ti ; 0(s) g i (Is), g; (.1., ․))
which may differ from 10(h,w,t1 s) when g*2 differs from g2.
The distribution of the tasteshifters (e(z)) and the form of v0 is assumed to be
invariant with respect to different wage setting policies and consequently the form of g( )
will remain invariant with respect to changes in 0(s), &(' s) and &('I ',․). Thus the
parameters of W.), or rather v(), are deep structural parameters.
Since the supply now differs from the demand, the set of feasible matches no longer
is represented by 0(s)g1 (.1s). Specifically, some workers now will face quantity constraints
in addition to the qualification requirements represented by 0(s)g1( Is). Let 0*(5)g5)
represent the actual constrained distribution of feasible matches. Evidently, Er(s)e( Is) is
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determined from
(3.12)	 11(11, w,t1 ;0*(s)&*(-1s),g;(.., ․)) = y(h,w,ti I s).
The left hand side of (3.12) expresses the "constrained" supply density - or the density of
realized attributes, (H(2), W(2), T1(2)) when the workers are facing choice sets of feasible
matches that differ from the ones generated by 0(s)g 1(' I s).
Let us summarize the difference between the stories in subsections 3.2 and 3.3. In
subsection 3.2 each worker faces a distribution of matches for which he is qualified and the
wage function fve), or equivalently, the conditional wage opportunity density g2(.111,t1 ,․) in
(3.10) is set such that markets clear. In subsection 3.3, however, the wage opportunity density
ge21 (.111,t1 ,․) is exogenously given which implies that the supply density differs from the
demand density. Consequently, some workers will be rationed and the actual set of feasible
market matches is represented by 0*(s)g;(.1s), which may differ from 0(s)g 1(.1s).
Consider finally the relationship between the unemployment rate, and the densities of
supplied and realized match attributes. Specifically, let p(h,w,t, Is) be defined as
(3.13)
p(h,w,t i Is) = (h, w, ; O(s) ( • I s), g; • I *,	 -	 w, ; 0 *(s) g: (• I s), g; (.1; s))
g(h,w,t i ; 0(s)g1 s),g;
The interpretation of (3.13) is as the unemployment rate for jobs with attributes
(H(z)=h, W(z)=w, T1 (z)=t 1), similarly to the standard definition of the unemployment rate.
From (3.13) we obtain
(3.14)
g(h,w,ti ; 0*(s)g is (ls),g;('j', ․)) = g(h,w,t 1 ,13(s)g1 (.I s), g; (-I s)) (1 -p(h,w,t s)).
Eq. (3.14) is of interest for identification and estimation purposes. Provided data on
unemployment, for each category of attribute combination, is available, then the parameters
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of the supply density 1.1(11,w,t1;0(s)g1(' Is),g;(1 •,․)) rather than the constrained density
igh,w,t1 ,0*(s)g;(.1s),g;(1 •, ․)) can be estimated. A related expression for the labor supply
densities is given by Blundell et al. (1987).
3.4. Further simplifications
For the sake of reducing the problems related to identification and estimation of
structural parameters it is of interest to consider the structure of the model that follows when
some further assumptions are maintained. Assume now that the opportunity density of hours
of work and observable match attributes {Ti(z)) does not depend on the workers skills s and
that the wage W(z) only depend on z through T(z), i.e.,
	
(3.15)	 W(z) = *(T(z)).
Assumption (3.15) does not necessary mean that the match-specific wages and hours
are uncoil-elated. In fact, since T(z) and H(z) may be correlated across matches it follows that
W(z) and H(z) also may be correlated. Assumption (3.15) simply states that T(z) is a
sufficient statistics in the wage function *O. Then it follows that the opportunity density of
(H(z),W(z),Ti(z)) can be written as
	
(3.16)	 g	 s) = (h,ti) g2 (w I s)
where
(3.17)
and i2(w,t 1) is determined by
ai2 (w,ti)
g2 (w I ,․) = g2 (f2 (w,t i) I ti , s) I 	 w 	I
(3.18)	 w = Aijt1,12(w,t1)).
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From (3.16) and (3.6) it follows that the conditional density of H(2) given (W(2),T1 (2)), and
given that the individual works takes the form
(3.19) (p(h I w,ti ,․) =
(f) (h,w,t, I s)	 (exp (v (h,w,t))) gl (h,ti)   
(x,w,ti I s) dx	 f(exp (Ay (x,w,t i))) g1 (X,;) dx
Similarly, the conditional density of W(2) given (H(2),T 1(2)) and given that the individual
works takes the form
(f)
	
(3.20)	 (p(w I h,t ,s = 	
(h,w,ti s)	 (exp (h,w,ti))) g2 (w I ti , s)
(h,y,ti I s) dy 	 pexp (h,y,t i))) g2 (y I ti , s) dy
From (3.20) we note that cp(w ih,t 1 , ․) does not depend on the opportunity density g 1().
Moreover, formula (3.20) illustrates the well-known selectivity bias problem in that the
density of realized wages in general is different from the density of offered (feasible) wages,
g2(w ti ,․). Evidently, an analogous expression to (3.20) holds in the general case where
«is) is given by (3.6). The particular assumptions maintained in the present subsection
illustrate, however, an additional consequence of selectivity, namely that even if the offered
wage density g2(w Iti ,․) does not depend on hours, the realized wage density, conditional on
hours, depends on hours. An analogous observation can be made regarding the conditional
offered and realized densities of hours in (3.19).
Finally, we will consider the special case that emerges when the preferences do not
depend on rrI (z)), i.e.,
	
(3.21)	 V (C,h,t i ) E v (C,h)
and in addition the offered wage distribution is independent of (Tl(z));
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(3.22)	 g2 (w	 F- g2 (w Is).
Then (3.6) and (3.7) reduce to
	
(3.23)	 (h,w s) 	
0(s) (exp (v(h,w))) (h) g2(w s)
cp 
0(s) ff(exp (v(x,y))) g i (x) g2(y I s)dxdy + exp (v(0,0))
and
	
(3.24)	 (P (0,0 I s) 	
exp (v(0,0)) 






(3.26)	 v(h,w) v (f (hw, I)/p, h) .
In the empirical part of the paper we estimate a model version for two-person households that
is analogous to (3.23) and (3.24). Moreover, unemployment will not be accounted for. The
justification for these simplifications of the model are:
- It seems reasonable that hours of work are determined by institutional regulations
and the nature of the jobs.
- We have no reliable observations of Trvariables.
- The unemployment rate in Norway was less than 2 per cent both in 1979 and 1986
and thus close to full employment by international standards.
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4. EXTENSION OF THE MODEL TO TWO-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS (MARRIED
COUPLES)
The decision problem of a married couple is to determine jointly the labor supply of
the wife and husband as well as the level of consumption of the household, subject to the
budget and hours constraints.
Let U(C(hp,hm,z) denote the household's utility function where hp and hm denote the
wife's and husband's hours of work, respectively. C is total consumption of the household
and z = (zp,zm) indexes the matches of the wife, 4, and husband, zm, respectively.




(4.2)	 pC(z) = f(HF(z)WF(z),Hm(z)Wm(z),I)
where HF(z), WF(z), Hm(z) and Wm(z) are the match-specific hours of work and wages for the
wife and for the husband, respectively. C is household consumption and I denotes capital
income. f0 is the function that transforms gross income into consumption. p is the price-
index. As above (TF(z),Tm(z)) (T iF(z),T2F(z),Tim(z),T2m(z)) represents the match-specific
attributes relative to wife and husband.
Under assumptions that are straight forward extensions of the assumptions of the
preceding section we can write
(4.3)
	
U (C(z),HF(z),Hm(z), z)) = v (C(z), HF(z),Hm(z), TiF(z), Tim(z)) + e (z)
where (HF(z),Hm(z),TF(z),Tm(z),e(z)) is an enumeration of the points of a Poisson process
with intensity measure
(dhF, dhm, dtF, dtm I s) e	 , tF = (t iF, t2F), tm = (tim, t2m), s = (sF, sm).
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We define en(s) as the mean number of market matches that is feasible for the
husband and for the wife. Furthermore, 001 (sF) is the mean number of market matches that is
feasible for the female. Ow(sm) is defmed analogously (by replacing wife and husband).
Let G(wp,wm,hF,hm,tiptim I s) be the equilibrium opportunity distribution, i.e., the
probability that a market match for which
(WF(z)Sw, Wm(z)Swm, lip(z)Shr Hm(z)Shm, TiF(z)5tir Tim(z)Stim)
is feasible. The density of G(1s) corresponds to (3.3) in the case of single person
households. Let Gm(wm,hm,tm Ism) be the probability that a match (Wm(z)Swm,Hm(z)Swm,
T1m(z)5tim) is feasible for the husband and let GF(wp,hp,t1F I sp) be the analogous opportunity
distribution for the wife.
Assumptions that are completely analogous to those of Section 3 yield the densifies
of realized hours and wages for the couple.
We only state the choice probabilities in the case where the preferences are
independent of {Tir,(z),Tim(z)), offered hours for the husband and the wife are independent,
offered hours are independently distributed of other attributes and the wage opportunity
density is independent of (HF(z),Hm(z),TiF(z),T1F(z)). This is completely analogous to the case
considered in (3.23)-(3.24). We then get
(4.4)
(hF, hm, wF, WM I s) =
011 (s) (exp (Av (hF, hm, wF, wm))) g iF (11F) gi h ) g2 (wF, wm s)
D
for h>0, hm>0, wp>0, wm>0, where




D = On (s) ffff(exp (v (x i , x2, yi , y2))) gip (xi) gim (x2) g2 (Y1' Y2 I S) dX1 dX2dYi dY2
+ eio(SF) ff(exp (O, x2, 0, yr 0))) g1F (x2) g 	 sr') dx242
+ (Sm)ff(exp (Nr (x l , 0, yl , 0, 0))) g im (x1) km (y1 I s m) dxi dyi + exp (y(0,0)).
Here g2F(wp sp) and g2m(wm Ism) denote the respective conditional marginal opportunity
(offered) wage densities, and &F(hh?), g lm(hm), the marginal opportunity hours densities. The
densities that correspond to the respective corner solutions are analogous to (3.24).
Note that, a priori, the offered wage rates for wife and husband are allowed to be
dependent. This is to account for correlation in unobserved qualification variables due to the
fact that men with high education tend to marry women with high education.
5. DATA
The data are obtained from two different data sources with information about couples
in Norway that are married (not cohabitating) through 1979 and 1986. The first source is
based on a questionnaire and contains data on hours worked (by intervals), wage rates and
socio-demographic variables such as the number and age of children and education level. The
other source is based on filled in and approved tax reports and yields detailed information
about reported incomes, legal deductions, taxes paid and transfer payments received. The two
sets of data are linked on the basis of personal identification numbers. The Central Bureau
of Statistics has been responsible for collecting and preparing the data sets. The data based
on the tax reports have been used to check the answers on the wage rates and hours worked
given in the questionaire. For around 90 per cent of those working in 1979 as well as in 1986
the reported wage rate has been used. Hours worked per year are obtained by dividing the
reported labor income per year by the reported wage rate (or the predicted rate in about 10
per cent of the cases).
The sample selection rules are as follows. Only couples where the age of the husband
is less than 66 years and the age of the wife is between 27 (25 in 1986) and 66 years are
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included. Those couples for which one or both spouses have entrepreneurial income that
exceeds wage income are excluded. Couples for which the wife or husband have reported
hours of work above 3600 hours per year are excluded. When the reported female wage rate
is below 15 or above 56 NOK (1979) it is predicted by a wage equation. The same procedure
is followed when the male wage rate is below 24 or above 74 NOK (1979). Not working is
defined as working less than or equal to 60 hours per year. An analogous procedure is
followed for 1986.
In Table I-79 we report sample statistics for some selected variables in 1979.
(Table I-79)
(Table I-86)
From Table I we realize that wage rates for females are on average 75 per cent of the
wage rates for males. Female hours of work are on average only 50 per cent of the male
hours of work. Full-time and part-time hours of work-intervals are defmed as follows: Full-
time hours for males is [2120,2200], for females, [2000,2080], and part-time for females is
[1020,1260]. These defmitions are based on observed full-time and part-time peaks in these
intervals. Table I-86 gives the corresponding sample statistics for 1986. The consumer price
index is used as the composite price index with 1979 as the reference year. The level in 1986
is 1.83.
6. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
In the present section we report estimation results. As noted in Sections 2 and 3 we
have estimated the model conditional on household characteristics that are supposed to
influence the preferences and the qualifications. The variables that are supposed to influence
preferences are age and number of children in the household less than 6 and above 6 years.
Variables that measure qualifications are length of schooling and experience defined as age
minus length of schooling minus 6.
a4 + as log Am + a6 (log Aý2)
(43
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In the version estimated here we have not taken into account the heterogeneity on the
demand side with respect to job types, represented in the model by (T 1(z)). Since we believe
that the qualitative aspects of the jobs is very important this means that the quality of the
present empirical study is reduced.
In order to estimate the model we need to specify functional forms for v(C,hF,hm),
go(h), g lm(h), g2(wF,wm Is), 011(s), 010(SF) and 001 (sm). Recall that we do not estimate the true
structural parameters of an equilibrium wage density and as a consequence we are therefore
not able to apply the estimated model to perform policy experiments that would require
estimates of a full structural equilibrium model. We have chosen v(C,hF,hm) to be a Box-Cox
type function, separable in leisure and Consumption. This specification allovs for fairly
flexible income and substitution elasticities (given separability). Thus
(6.1)
((lO'C)a' -1)v (C, hp, hm) = a2
+	
-1)
(as + a9 logAF + a10 (logAF)2 + an CU6 + a12 C06) + ai3 LFLm
(xi
where AF,Am are the age of the wife and the husband, respectively, CU6 and C06 are number
of children less than 6 and above 6 years, LK is leisure for gender k=M,F, defined as
LK 1 • hK/8760,
and ai, j = 1,2,...,13, are unknown parameters.
If al<1, a.3<1, a7<1, a2>0,








a, + as,logA, + ocio (log AF)2 + aii CU6 + oc12 C06 > 0
then v(C,11F,hm) is increasing in C, decreasing in (hp,hm) and strictly concave in (C,hp,hm).
The densities of offered hours, giF(hk), k=F,M, are assumed uniform except for a peak
at full-time hours for males and peaks at full-time and part-time hours for females. The
offered wage densities are specified as a joint lognormal density with means
(6.2) ElogWk(z) = 130k 0101k + 13202k + t..31enk
R .2
k=F,M, where s ik denote years of schooling, gender k, and s2k = experience = Ao lk-6. It
should be noted that {Wk(z)) are nominal wages and hence the estimate of Bok will reflect the
nominal changes from 1979 to 1986. Moreover, the opportunity measures 010(sF), 001(sm) and




+ a s14	 15 ir(6.3)
(6.4)
and
(6.5)	 - log(On(s)) = am + aissIF a16 + an.
The parameters to be estimated are oci, j=1,2,...,17, Bjk, j=1,2,3, the covariances in the
wage density, and coefficients that correspond to full-time and part-time hours (three
coefficients).
Above we assumed that the opportunity distributions for hours were uniform except
for full-time and part-time peaks. Unless this or analogous assumptions are made it is not
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possible to separate some of the structural coefficients in the mean utility function from the
parameters of the opportunity densities for hours.
It is of interest to note that since the logarithm of the opportunity density of hours and
the utility function enter symmetrically into (4.4) it would be possible to interpret the peaks
as stemming from preferences in which case the offered hours would be generated by a
uniform distribution. In fact, if preferences and the opportunity density of hours are kept fixed
we can perform policy simulations with respect to changes in demographic variables, taxes
and wage rates based on the estimated model that are consistent with either interpretation.
The estimation is based on a procedure suggested by McFadden (1978), cf. Ben-Aldva
and Lerman (1985), which yields results that are close to the full information maximum
likelihood method. We are not able to use the exact likelihood function to estimate the model
because the evaluation of the integrals in (4.6) would be too costly and cumbersome. The
estimation procedure applied replaces the continuous four-tuple integral in the denominators
of the densities by a sum over 30, (alternatively 70), random points, where each term is
adjusted by appropriate weights. In other words, the continuous logit model is replaced by a
discrete logit version. McFadden has demonstrated that this method yields consistent and
asymptotically normal parameter estimates. We found McFadden estimation procedure to be
remarkably efficient. Our experience suggests that it is enough to replace the choice set by
10 random points (draws in K) to obtain good results. When the number of draws increases
to 30 then the estimated standard errors seem to be close to the corresponding ones obtained
by the full maximum likelihood procedure.
The estimation results are reported in Table II and III.
(Table II)
(Table III)
Note that most parameters are rather precisely determined (apart from the cross leisure
term which is set equal to zero in 1986) and they have the theoretically expected signs.
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If we compare the estimates from 1979 with those from 1986 we find that the
estimates of a2, ai and an have changed slightly in the sense that the respective estimated
differences have 95 per cent confidence intervals that not include zero. The most important
differences is found to be in the parameter associated with small children. It is reasonable to
interpret this result as a consequence of the increased availability in childcare opportunities
from 1979 to 1986.
The estimates imply that the mean utility function is an increasing and strictly concave
function in consumption and leisure. The males marginal mean utility of leisure attains a
minimum at the age of 41.9 years and in the case of females, at the age of 35 years (1979)
and at the age of 38.5 and 33.8 in 1986. The wife's education turns out to affect the fraction
of feasible market matches such that a higher educated woman has more job opportunities
than a less educated one. (Implied by Cc15<0.)
Table ifi demonstrates that the selectivity .bias is rather small; i.e., the OLS estimates
(only 1979 estimates are reported) are close to the maximum likelihood estimates. Preliminary
estimation results showed that the offered male and the female wage rates were close to be
independent. For computational convenience the joint wage density therefore is assumed to
factor, i.e., g2(wp,wm Is) = g2F(wF I S0g2M(WM ISM)* The mean wage rate is found to be a
concave function of experience with a peak at 32.3 years of experience for men and at 30.8
years for women (1979). The corresponding figures for 1986 are 34.6 and 36.8. Moreover,
it seems that education has a stronger impact on female wage- than on male wage rates.
It is interesting to note that the parameter estimates 42 14 and d16 associated with the
female and male opportunity measures have decreased considerably from 1979 to 1986. This
means that the corresponding opportunity measures have increased in this period. This finding
accords well with stylized facts about the Norwegian economy. According to these facts the
Norwegian economy experienced a boost in consumption and labor demand in the mid 1980s.
Thus the parameter estimates of the model are consistent with a story where the increasing
level of employment in the period 19794986 is due mainly to increased labor demand. In
conventional labor supply models, without opportunity measures, the increase in labor supply
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would be interpreted as resulting from a shift in preferences. Thus our empirical results
demonstrate the importance of allowing for an econometric specification that accounts for
aspects of the jobs other than wages and hours of work.
It can be demonstrated that the following simulation procedure of the model is
consistent and rather efficient.
First draw whether a market match is feasible for one or both adults of the households
according to probabilities O n(s)d, 910(s)d and 001(s)d where (1+001(s)+010(s)+011(s))d=1.
Second, draw n points (say),
{HF(z),Hm(z),WF(z),Wm(z), e (z)), z = 1,2,...,n.
Here {HF(z)) and (Hm(z)) are drawn from uniform distributions with full- and part-
time peaks, {W(z)) and (Wm(z)) are drawn from lognormal distributions according to the
wage equations and {e(z)) are drawn from the extreme value distribution, exp(-e -e). Third,
find the realized hours and wages (HF(2),Hm(1),WF(1),Wm(2)) by maximizing
v(HF(z),Hm(z),WF(z),Wm(z)) + e(z)
with respect to z=1,2,...,n. Repeat this procedure for every household in the sample. When n
is large this procedure yields results that are close to an "exact" simulation of the model.
The simulation procedure we have followed in the present paper is a refinement of the
one described above and it is unbiased for finite n and more efficient. This refmed procedure
will be described and analyzed elsewhere.
Figures 1 and 2 give the observed and simulated distributions for hours of work in
1979. These figures demonstrate that the model is able to reproduce the observed distributions
quite well. (Figures for 1986 give a similar conclusion.) For females the fit is remarkably
good while for males the model is less able to reproduce hours of work at the right hand tail.
The explanation of these high observed hours of work may (in addition to possible





The structure of the econometric model implies that the conditional density given that
the realized hours and wages fall within a given region, Ke Kt, has the same structure as the
unconditional one. This property is essential for the McFadden estimation procedure.
Formally, the conditional density is defmed by
(7.1) (hF, hm, Ayr wm 1 s, K) =
(hp, hm, WEI, Wm I S)
L9(xidErypy2is) dx i dx2dYi dY2
Thus since (7.1) has the "same structure" as the unconditional density it is easy to
carry out estimation on the basis of subsamples (K) through the corresponding conditional
likelihood. If the theoretical model is correctly specified the estimates based on different
subsamples should not be significantly different.
The procedure developed by Hausman and McFadden (1984) (HM) is designed to test
this kind of hypothesis. We have carried out 14 estimation runs in which different subsamples
have been selected each time from the 1979 sample. In each case we have computed the Chi-
square statistics, QK, given by HM, that corresponds to the difference between the estimates
based on the respective subsample indexed by K and the estimate based on the whole sample.
These subsamples have been selected as follows: The first 7 ones were selected by removing
those couples with hours of work within [3000,3600], [2400,3000], [1800,2400], [1200,1800],
[600,1200], [60,600], [0,60], respectively. The next 7 subsamples were obtained by removing
couples for which only the female hours of work were within the above intervals,
respectively. According to HM, QK has two degrees of freedom. To determine the joint
significance level for all 14 cases we have applied the Bonferoni method. By the Bonferoni
method the 0.05 critical value is about 11.3. All 14 values of QK are found to be less than
11.3.
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8. WAGE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES
In labor supply studies it is common to report individual elasticities for mean sample
values, or for subsamples of individuals who are grouped according to some socio-
demographic characteristics. This is meaningful when the error terms are assumed to be
independent of C and h. This is not the case in our model since, for given HF(z)=hp,
Hm(z)=hm, w(z)=w, wm(z)=wm, the utility function is given by
(8.1) v (hp hm, wpr, wm) + e (iv (hp, wi,), "im (hm, WM))
where "i (hi,wi), j=F,M, denotes the match with hours and wage equal to h wi.
The mean utility, vO, is the utility concept that comes closest to the one used by
others in the calculation of elasticities. With these reservations in mind we have calculated
local elasticities based on Ni for the "mean sample household" given that the couple works.
To calculate these elasticities one has to assume that the labor supply of the mean
sample household can be simulated by maximizing the deterministic part of the utility
function under the constraint of a linearized version of the budget constraint.
Of course, this assumption is at odds with the assumptions underlying the model
outlined above. But it is done here to present results that to some extent can be compared
with the results reported by others. Therefore, let mi denote the marginal wage rate (gross
wage rate after marginal tax rate) for spouse j around the optimal point of adjustment for the
mean sample household. And let I denote the virtual income which means that the linearized
budget constraints can be written
(8.2) C =
Maximizing v(C,hF,hm) in (6.1) w.r.t. hp given (8.2), with mi and' considered as given
yields the following first order conditions,
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(8.3) av/ahm = -	 • j = M,F.
av/aC
From (8.2) and (8.3) "optimal values" for Ili follows. Applying the estimated utility
function and mean sample values for mi and I for a household where both spouses work
(mm=19.01, m=19.80 and 1=30729) give the result (1979) that he.--1307, 141=2289,
C=101000).
The female's labor supply is close to the observed mean sample value (1312) and the
male's is also pretty close (2218), which also imply that the simulated consumption does not
deviate too much from the observed value (96 500), (1979).
From (8.2), (8.3) and from the estimated utility function one can derive exact formulas
for labor supply elasticities. We have computed
- uncompensated marginal wage elasticities; hours hi with respect to marginal wage rates mi
(Cournot elasticities)
- virtual income elasticities; hours hi w.r.t.
- compensated or utility constant elasticities (Slutsky elasticities)
- consumption constant elasticities (Frisch elasticities).
In the derivation of the formulaes below we have set the cross leisure term a13 equal
to O.
The elasticity formulas for the females are given in Appendix II. The elasticities for
the males are completely analogous.
These elasticities are denoted mean utility elasticities and they are reported in Table
IV for the selected sample means.
(Table IV-79)
(Table IV-86)
We see from Table IV that the own-wage elasticities are rather high. Females seem
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to be more wage-responsive than males and the Slutsky-elasticities show that substitution
effects are strong, especially for women. For females all wage elasticities have numerically
been reduced from 1979 to 1986.
Another set of elasticities arise when we consider how the mean in the distribution of
labor supply is affected by changes in say, wage levels. These elasticities are denoted
aggregate ones since they take into account unobserved and observed heterogeneity in the
population as well as the non-convexity of the budget constraint and hours restrictions.
(Table V)
The aggregate elasticities are calculated as follows: The model is used to simulate
(stochastic simulations) the labor supply for each household (wife and husband) under the
current regime and when the mean wage rate is increased by 10 per cent. The aggregate
elasticity of, for example, female labor supply is obtained by calculating the relative change
in the mean (mean over all females) female labor supply that results from this wage increase.
These elasticities are reported in Table V.
The results show that female participation is slightly more elastic than hours supplied,
conditional on working in 1979, while the opposite is true in 1986. For men the differences
in elasticities are quite smaller. Moreover, hours supplied by men, conditional on working,
is almost inelastic.
The elasticities in the second line of Table V can be compared with the Cournot
elasticities given in Table IV. We observe that the cross terms are of the same sign, and they
are not so very different in size. Since the aggregate elasticities are the ones that are
consistent with the model, we observe that the mean utility elasticities overestimate the own-
wage response among women to a great extent.
The last line of Table V is equal to the sum of the first and second line, since for each
individual the unconditional expectation equals the product of the probability of working and
the expected hours worked, conditional on working. The total supply elasticities imply that
31
a 10 per cent increase in the mean of the male wage rates will increase expected hours
supplied by men by 4.5 per cent and reduce expected hours supplied by women by 5.1 per
cent (1979). The corresponding estimates for 1986 are 3.1 and 2.4.
Women are more responsive than men since a 10 per cent increase of the female wage
rates will increase expected hours supplied by 18.2 per cent. The corresponding negative
cross-effect for males labor supply is rather weak, 1.5 per cent (1979). Th estimates for 1986
are numerically quite lower, 9.2 and 0.8 respectively.
The impact of an overall wage increase of 10 per cent can be found by adding own
wage and cross-wage elasticities. The positive impact of an overall wage increase on female
labor supply is substantially lower than a partial increase, a fact that should be kept in mind
when cross-section estimates are compared with estimates based on partial time-series studies
in which, typically, male and female wage rates grow almost at the same rate.
CONCLUSION
The difficulties with the current econometric models of labor supply are their
inadequacy to deal with; (i) Exact representation of complicated budget sets, for example
separate taxation for some income combinations and joint taxation for other combinations,
latent constraints on hours of work and qualitative job attributes, (iii) general specifications
of the utility function.
The methodology presented in the present paper has proved to be practical for dealing
with (i) through (iii). While the Hausman methodology is operational for simple labor supply
curves with piecewise linear non-convex budget sets it is hard to apply this procedure in
general.
A particular empirical version of the model has been estimated on samples of
Norwegian married couples where neither spouse has main income from selfemployment. The
empirical specification is based on a Box-Cox type utility function which is separable in
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consumption and leisure, globally concave and allows for flexible patterns of substitution and
income effects.
The empirical results demonstrate that the model reproduces the (unconditional)
distribution for labor supply of males and females quite well and the parameters of the utility
function are found to be rather stable from 1979 to 1986 except for the effect of small
children which has been reduced. Thus, the observed increase in employment and hours
worked in this period is not explained by a shift in preferences but due to an increase in
market opportunities. This fmding accords well with the fact that the Norwegian economy
experienced a boost in consumption and labor demand in the mid 1980s.
The wage elasticities of the mean labor supply turn out to be rather high for females.
From 1979 to 1986 all wage elasticities have been reduced which is explained by the
increased working loads.
33
Table I-79. Sample Values - Married Couples (778 households)
Averages	 Standard	 Min.	 Max.
deviations	 values	 values
Hours worked per year by wife
Hours worked per year by
husband
Female gross wage rate, NOK
per hour (among those who
work)
Male gross wage rate, NOK per
hour (among those who work)
Female gross labor income,
NOK per year




Wife's education in years
Husband's educations in years
Age of the wife
Age of the husband
Number of children below 6
Number of children 7-20
Female participation rate, per
cent
Male participation rate, per cent
	919	 859	 0	 3 368
	
2 059	 740	 0	 3 572
	
31.30	 6.10	 15.50	 55.80
	
41.60	 9.4	 24.00	 73.90
	
30 021	 29 914	 0	 152 497
	
84 911	 35 701	 0	 185 988
	
88 739	 26 191	 20 554	 222 325
	
10.5	 1.7	 9.0	 17.5
	
11.4	 2.5	 9.0	 18.0
	
43.6	 11.3	 27	 66
	
46.1	 11.5	 25	 66
	
0.36	 0.66	 0	 4
	
1.01	 1.55	 0	 •	 6
70.3
92.8
Hours worked per year by wife
Hours worked per year by
husband
Female gross wage rate, NOK
per hour (among those who
work)
Male gross wage rate, NOK per
hour (among those who work)
Female gross labor income,
NOK per year




Wife's education in years
Husband's educations in years
Age of the wife
Age of the husband
Number of children below 6
Number of children 7-20
Female participation rate, per
cent
Male participation rate, per cent
	1 133	 812	 0	 3 459
	
1 958	 749	0	 3 551
	
35.52	 9.29	 14.20	 92.90
	
46.45	 12.57	 20.77	 108.20
	
39 962	 30 538	 0	 163 101
	
91 284	 42 855	 0	 262 273
	
109 545	 32 254	 20 296	 217 911
	
10.4	 2.4	 7.0	 18.0
	
11.2	 2.9	 7.0	 20.0
	
41.4	 11.1	 25	 66
	
45.2	 11.7	 25	 66
	
0.41	 0.70	 •	 0	 4
	




Table I-86. Sample Values - Married Couples (1 518 households)*
Averages	 Standard	 Min.	 Max.
deviations	 values	 values
















Table II. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function and of the opportunity density*)



































































































































































































0.51	 -0.02	 1.57	 -0.06
	
0.52	 -0.01	 1.59	 -0.02
-0.01	 -0.02
	





Table IV-79. Mean utility/mean sample elasticities. Elasticities of hours with respect to
marginal wage levels and virtual income for those couples who work.









0.46	 -0.04	 2.69	 -0.15
	
0.48	 -0.03	 2.75	 -0.05
-0.01	 -0.07
	




Table W-86. Mean utility/mean sample elasticities. Elasticities of hours with respect to
marginal wage levels and virtual income for those couples who work.
Here C=124500, mm=25.50, mF=23.10, hm=2300, hF=1400. *
* Income and wage rates are in 1979 prices.
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Elasticities of conditional ex-
pectation of total supply of	 1979	 0.16	 -0.07	 0.99	 -0.26
hours	 1986	 0.11	 -0.05	 0.54	 -0.12
Elasticities of unconditional
expectation of total supply of	 1979	 0.45	 -0.15	 1.82	 -0.51
hours	 1986	 0.31	 -0.08	 0.92	 • -0.24
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APPENDIX I
Table AI: Effective total marginale tax rates for a married woman age 35, one child under
13 years of age, her wage rate is NOK 40 per hour and her husband's income is
NOK 75 000 per year, near average sample values. Norway 1979
Effective
Gross income	 Hours worked	 marginal




o- 2 000	 0 - 50	 0
	
2 000 - 9ØØØ	 50- 225	 23.0
	
9 000 - 9 500	 225 - 238	 48.0
	
9 500 - 10 000	 238 - 250	 63.4
	
10 000 - 10 833	 250 - 270	 61.9
	
10 833 - 11 250	 270 - 281	 66.6
	
11 250 - 16 000	 281 - 400	 46.7
	
16 000 - 17 500	 400- 438	 42.3
	
17 500 - 22 777	 438 - 570	 44.1
	
22 777 - 24 313	 570 - 607	 49.1
Joint taxation minimizes taxes
paid by the husband
	24 313 - 31 000	 607 - 775	 29.7
	
31 000 - 38 800	 775 - 970	 32.4	 Separate taxation minimizes
	
38 800 - 47 800	 970 - 1 195	 38.4	 taxes
	
47 800 - 64 800	 1 195 - 1 620	 43.4
	
64 800 - 75 000	 1 620 - 1 877	 48.4
75 000 - 75 941
75 941 - 87 705
87 705 - 99 470
99 470 - 119 470
119 470 - 154 764
1 877 - 1 899
1 899 - 2 192
2 192 - 2 487
2 487 - 2 987






Separate taxation, but capital
income and capital expenses
are allocated to the wife's
income and expences
	154 764 - 182 400	 3 869 - 4 560	 66.8
	
182 400 - 213 588	 4 560 - 5 339	 61.8	 Hours worked per year not
	
213 588 - 331 235	 5 339 - 8 280	 65.4	 feasible
	
331 235 - 350 400	 8 280 - 8 760	 67.2
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APPENDIX IL Mean utility elasticities, females
Cournot elasticities:
a log hp 	8760L 	 (1 - 1) hm 	 8760(1 -a l) Lm mm
a log mp N(1 -a)h	C 	C(1 -al)
a loghF _8760LF (1 -al) h(	 8760Lmmm





87604(1, (1-al)8760Lm mm )


















N = + 
(1-a1) (8760Lm mm 8760LFmF
C	 1 -	 1-;	 )).
Strict concavity implies positive direct Slutsky and Frisch elasticities.
With a zero cross-leisure term in the utility function the cross Frisch elasticities equal
zero. The cross Slutsky-elasticities as well as the cross Cournot are negative. The model
allows for backward bending supply curves, that is, negative direct Cournot elasticities. A
necessary condition for negative direct Cournot elasticity for females is
mp hp 1 -	 mmLin .8760
1 - (1 - a l)	 + 	 < O.
C	 1 - a3 	C
We observe that a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for positive direct Cournot-
elasticities is positive ai; i.e., 0 5 ai 5 1. Since we have estimated ai to be positive, both
direct Cournot elasticities are always positive.
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APPENDIX III. Derivation of choice probabilities
Consider the following choice problem. For expository simplicity we shall discuss the
case with a single "objective" attribute and a tasteshifter associated with each alternative. The
general case with several attributes is completely analogous. The agent's choice set is a
realization of a Poisson process on [0,1]xR where each point is a choice alternative. Thus to
each point z there are two (continuous) attributes (T(z), e(z)) where T(z) e [0,1] and e(z) e
R. The intensity measure of the Poisson process is
(dt) • e de = V(t) dt • e de
where V(t) is the derivative of X(t). The agents utility function is defined by
(A.1) U(z) = v (T(z)) + e(z)
where t	 v(*) is a (measurable) function. Let A be a Borel set A c [0,1] and define
(A.2) UA "jg max (v(T(z)) + e(z)).
T(z)e A
The interpretation of UA is as the highest utility the agent can attain subject to T(z)e A. We
shall now derive the c.d.f. for UA. Let
B = kt, e) : v(t) + e > u, te
and let N(B) be the number of Poisson points within B. By the Poisson law
(A.3)
	
P (N(B) = n) = A(B)n exp (- A(B))
n!
where A(B) = EN(B) and is given by
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(A.4)
A(B) = fi3 V(y) e dy de
=V(y) e "de dy = e -uf ev(Y) X,i(y) dy
e A 1(y)+6>u	 A
Now it follows from (A.3) that
NUA 	= P(There are no points of the Poisson process in B)
(A.5) = P(N(B) =0) exp (- A(B)) exp(- e f evwX1(y)dy).
A
Eq. (A.5) proves that UA is extreme value distributed with
(A.6)	 EUA = log5ev(Y)X1(y)dy + 0.5772....
(cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985).
Let A be the complement of A. Since the Poisson realizations are independently
distributed it follows that UA and UA are independent and extreme value distributed.




v (T(2)) + e() maxz (v (T(z)) + e (z)) .
P (T(2) e A) = P (UA = maxi (v (T(z)) + e (z)))
exp (EUA)
= P(UA >11.Ä) =
exp (EUA) + exp (EIJÄ)
The last equality follows from standard results in discrete choice analysis (cf. Ben-Akiva and
Lerman, op.cit.). With A = [0,1] we get from (A.8) that
(A.9)
which has probability density
(A.10)
evol Xi(y) dy
P (T(I) t) = 	
11 e vo Xi(y) dy
dP (T(2) t) 	e'  V(t)
dt	 evo Xi(y) dy
The proof of (3.6) is completely analogous to the argument presented above.
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